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COMMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FISHERY
MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS UNDER
THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 1976, President Ford signed into law the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 19761 (FCMA) establishing a
comprehensive program to manage marine fisheries within 200 nautical miles of the United States coasts. The administrative structure
established to manage these resources is unique among governmental
institutions. 2 It is composed of eight Regional Fishery Management
Councils, which are responsible for formulating management plans
for each fishery, and the Secretary of Commerce, who must review
and approve every management proposal from each Council. From
this framework will emerge fishery management schemes affecting all
persons who have an interest in the fishing industry-foreign fishermen,
American fishermen (whether commercial or recreational), canners,
conservationists, consumers, and others.
There are many issues under the Act which may come before the
courts, including the effect of the National Environmental Policy Act 3
on management schemes and whether there may be judicial review of
the executive branch's decisions on applications from foreign nations
to fish within the 200-mile zone. 4 But of paramount importance to
1.

Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-

1882 (West Supp. 1977)) [hereinafter cited as FCMAI.
2. See Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. RzEV. 427, 436

(1977).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). The preparation of environmental impact
statements will require the Regional Councils and the Secretary to consider factors in
management schemes that the FCMA does not require. For example, an impact statement on a management plan would be required to consider the incidental catch of a
non-target species, whereas the FCMA does not require such a factor to be considered in making management decisions.
4.

FCMA § 204, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824 (West Supp. 1977). The Secretary of Com-

merce falls within the definition of "agency" under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1970). Thus, because no statute precludes review of
the Secretary's determinations as to foreign permits, the judicial review provisions of
the APA would apply unless such action is committed to agency discretion by law,
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those with a stake in the outcome of the management schemes is section 305(d) of the Act, which governs judicial review of fishery management regulations. 5 Unfortunately, congressional discussion of this
section is virtually non-existent,6 as the provision was a last minute
addition to the Act. 7 It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the
scope of this section and to suggest some guidelines for its interpretation, recognizing, however, that such an attempt in the absence of any
judicial precedent under the Act may be perilous.
II.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

The legislative objective-establishing a national fishery management program-is to be implemented chiefly through the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils. 8 Each Council is responsible
for preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Commerce a fishery
id. § 701(a)(2), or is a political question. The paramount case construing the "committed to agency discretion" exception is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), where the Court stated: "the exception for action 'committed to agency discretion' . . . is a very narrow exception . . . . The legislative

history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those
rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply.'" Id. at 410. There clearly is law to apply under § 204 of the
FCMA, and therefore the issue is whether foreign permits are in the realm of foreign
relations and political questions which courts should avoid deciding. See, e.g., Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (NOAA).
512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally, Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
5. FCMA § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp. 1977).
6. Only one sentence of legislative explanation exists regarding this section. See
S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), - -'rinted in SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 37, 90
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] quoted at note 61

infra.
7. The present section 305(e) regarding the Secretary's authority to promulgate
emergency regulations was labelled as section 305(d) throughout the legislative proceedings. The present section 305(d) did not exist until March 24, 1976, when it was
inserted by the Conference Committee Report. See S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27, 54 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 37, 63, 90.
The Senate version of the FCMA originally provided for the establishment of a
"Fishery-Management Review Board," with exclusive and original jurisdiction over
appeals from the Secretary's fishery management determinations. Appeals from this
quasi-judicial body were then to be brought in the federal court of appeals for the
circuit nearest the fishery involved. S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1975), discussed in S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1975).
8. FCMA § 302(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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management plan for each fishery within its geographical area of authority. 9 The plans are required to contain a complete description of
the fishery, including, inter alia,the fishing effort, the costs incurred in
management, the revenues from the fishery, and the recreational, foreign, and Indian treaty interests involved. 10 The Councils must assess
and specify the present and future condition of the fishery and the optimum yield, 1 the capacity and extent to which American vessels will
harvest the optimum yield,' 2 and the portion of the optimum yield
that will not be harvested and can be made available for foreign
fishing.' 3 The management plans are also required to contain conservation and management measures which the Regional Council determines to be necessary and appropriate for application to foreign and
domestic fishing.' 4 In making such determinations, the Councils must
conduct regional public hearings "so as to allow all interested persons
an opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management
plans and amendments to such plans, and with respect to the adminis15
tration and implementation of the provisions of this Act.'
After a fishery management plan is prepared by a Regional Council, it is submitted to the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary), who
reviews such plans,' 0 and either approves, disapproves, or partially
disapproves them.' 7 If a Council fails to develop and submit a management plan, or fails to change a plan that has been partially or
9.

Id. § 302(h)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(1).
Id. § 303(a)(2), (5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(2), (5).
11. Id. § 303(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(3). The optimum yield from a fishery

10.

is defined as:
the amount of fish(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particu-

lar reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable
yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social or ecological
factor.
Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18). The Act also requires that the plans contain

the specification of what the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) was determined to be,
and a summary of the information used by the Council in modifying the MSY to arrive at the optimum yield. Id. § 303(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(3).
12. Id. § 303(a)(4)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(4)(A).
13. Id. § 303(a)(4)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(4)(B).
14. Id. § 303(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(1)(A). Section 303(b), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1853(b) (West Supp. 1977), contains discretionary provisions which any Council
may include in a fishery management plan. These provisions include, inter alia,
limited entry programs, year and equipment limitations, zone regulations, permit and
fee requirements, and incorporation of coastal state management measures.
15. Id. § 302(h)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(3).
16. Id. § 304(a),(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854 (a), (b).
17. Id. § 304(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a)(2).
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completely disapproved by the Secretary, that region's fishery management plan may be prepared by the Secretary. 1 8 Once a management
plan has been approved or prepared by the Secretary, s/he must publish the plan and any proposed implementing regulations in the Federal
Register; interested persons will have not less than forty-five days to
submit written comments. 19 In addition, the Act provides that prior to
promulgation the Secretary may schedule a hearing on the manage20
ment plans or any proposed regulations.
III.

LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

Generally, both Congress 21 and the courts2 2 encourage and provide

for broad judicial review of administrative action as an essential element of our governmental system. Congress has the power to limit
judicial review, 23 but such limitation is not lightly presumed.2 4 Section
305(d) of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act provides
25
for a restricted review of regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
18. Id. § 304(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c). Management plans prepared by the
Secretary must be transmitted to the appropriate Council "for consideration and
comment." The Council has 45 days within which to recommend changes; after the
expiration of this period, the Secretary may implement the plan. Id. § 304(c)(2), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1854(c)(2). However, no limited entry system can be included in a plan
without the approval of the Council. Id. § 304(c)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c)(3).
19. Id. § 305(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a).
20. Id. § 305(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b). Congress did not anticipate, however,
that hearings would be held on management plans at this stage, as the Councils are
required to hold public hearings in drawing up the plans. Similarly Congress did not
seem to anticipate frequent hearings on the regulations. See S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 37, 90,
quoted at note 61 infra.
21. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes a presumption of judicial
review of agency action, "except to the extent that-(]) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. §
701(a) (1970).
22. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The Supreme Court
has on occasion indicated that Congress could preclude any judicial review. See Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441 (1850).
24. See cases cited in note 22 supra. See also Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review
11, 71 HARV. L. REV. 769, 791 (1958).

25. Section 305(d) of the Act (FCMA), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp.
1977) provides:
Regulations promulgated by the Secretary under this Act shall be subject to judicial review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of Title
5 [United States Code], if a petition for such review is filed within 30 days after
the date on which the regulations are promulgated; except that (1) section 705
of such title is not applicable, and (2) the appropriate court shall only set aside
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The limitatiois imposed by Congress include a narrow scope of review, a requirement that petitions for review be filed within thirty days
of a regulation's promulgation, and denial of the reviewing court's
authority to enjoin the implementation of the regulations pending review. Although none of these restrictions is novel by itself, and each
has a supporting policy, the FCMA's combination of these restrictions
is atypical.
A.

Petitionfor Review Must Be Filed Within Thirty Days

Section 305(d) provides that "[r] egulations promulgated by the
Secretary under this Act shall be subject to judicial review . . .if a
petition for such review is filed within 30 days after the date on which
the regulations are promulgated. '26 Congressional imposition of time
restrictions upon review is not a new concept, 27 and it generally has
been accepted by the courts.2 8 The rationale is that such time limits
promptly resolve issues of the regulations' validity and thereby prevent
delay in implementing important management programs.2 9 It does not
follow, however, that a person who fails to petition for review within
thirty days of promulgation will necessarily be forever barred from
contesting the validity of the regulation. The following discussion illustrates s'everal limited instances, based on the Constitution, the
FCMA, and judicial policy, when a court would not be deprived of
30
jurisdiction even though the thirty-day period for review had run.

any such regulation on a ground specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or
(D) of such title.
26.

27.

Id. § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d).

Recent statutes limiting review of agency regulations in a similar manner are

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp.

III 1973) and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1)
(1970). For other statutes similarly limiting judicial review of agency orders, see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970); Securities Act of 1933, id. §
77(i); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78(y); Public Utilities Holding Company Act, id. § 79(x); Natural Gas Act, id. § 717r(b); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 825(1)(b) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 210 (1970); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970); Communications Act, 47"U.S.C. § 402(b)
(1970).
28. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1944) (upholding 60day period for protest of administrator's regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); cases cited in note 33 infra.
29. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding 90 day limit of FWPCA); Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925, 926
(7th Cir. 1974) (upholding the 30-day review limit of the Clean Air Act).
30. Once the 30-day period has run and deprived a court of jurisdiction, neither
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The requirement of adequate notice

The regulations promulgated by the Secretary must be published in
the Federal Register.3 1 The thirty-day time period is measured from
the time the regulation is filed for publication with the office of the
Federal Register, not from the time the regulation is actually published. 32 This limited time in which an adversely affected person must
file a petition for review raises the constitutional issue of adequate notice.

If a party has actual notice of a regulation, there seems to be
nothing unreasonable about the thirty-day requirement. 33 The more
difficult question is whether publication in the Federal Register alone
is sufficient notice to all persons to preclude any direct challenge of
the regulation after thirty days. The Supreme Court has stated that
publication of regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of
their contents to everyone "regardless of actual knowledge of what is
in the Regulations or of the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance." 34 There is reason to believe, however, that this statement may
be too broad to apply to the FCMA's statutory provisions precluding
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), nor the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970) will serve as an independent jurisdictional
base, as neither act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts by itself. See, e.g., West
Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1975); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
31. FCMA § 305(a), 16U.S.C.A. § 1855(a) (West Supp. 1977).
32. See Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1970); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 399 (1958). Failure to publish as required by the Federal Register Act and § 3 of the APA are without consequence against a person having actual knowledge of a regulation. See, e.g., United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341
(2nd Cir. 1962); K. DAVIS, supra at 395-96. The Ninth Circuit Court does not follow
this rule, Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954), although this holding
has recently been questioned. United States v. Monroe, 408 F. Supp. 270, 276 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
33. The 30-day restriction of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1)
(1970), has been upheld in Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1189 (3d
Cir. 1975); Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf. Getty
Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
The 90-day restriction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1369(b)(1) (Supp. III 1973), was upheld in Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d
280 (2d Cir. 1976); Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1975).
34. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947). In this case a
farmer procured crop insurance from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation after
disclosing the facts to and receiving assurance from local agents of the corporation
that the crop was insurable. Neither he nor the agents knew that under a published
regulation the crop was uninsurable. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
435 (1944) (publication of regulation in Federal Register constitutes constructive notice to start running of 60-day restriction on filing for review).
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review of administrative regulations after thirty days. 35 First, procedural due process requires an opportunity, at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner, for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case. 36 It would be difficult to argue that an affected party who does
not acquire actual knowledge of the existence of a published regula-

tion within thirty days is given a meaningful opportunity to contest the
regulation's validity. On this basis, the thirty-day limit might be found
constitutionally infirm. A second and preferable means of dealing with
this problem, suggested by several courts, avoids the constitutional
issue: the thirty-day limitation period may be construed as a statute of
limitations which can be equitably tolled.3 7 Whether to toll the limitation would be within the equitable discretion of the court, but lack of
actual notice should certainly be a substantial factor in favor of
tolling. 38 This technique permits Congress to force a quick resolution
of a fishery management program's validity, yet also grants courts the
authority to avoid injustice in those few cases in which an aggrieved
party could not be reasonably expected to have knowledge of the gov-

erning regulation.
Assuming that constructive notice and the procedural requirements
35. The Merrill holding requires an individual contracting with the federal government on a matter that places a burden on the public treasury to be on notice of
the pertinent regulations published in the Federal Register. This is a substantially different issue from requiring an individual in a regulated but geographically dispersed
industry to be aware of published regulations within 30 days and to have a petition
filed within that time.
Although dictum in Yakus would seem to apply constructive knowledge to this
latter situation, 321 U.S. at 435, the petitioners in that case had actual knowledge of
the regulations. Id. Similarly, in each decision upholding the review limitations of the
FWPCA or Clean Air Act, see note 33 supra, the petitioner had actual notice of the
contested regulation.
36. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d
Cir. 1972).
37. See Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280, 291 (2d Cir. 1976) (suggested equitable tolling not followed because petitioner had actual notice of regulation); Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1975) (equitable tolling denied because petitioner had actual notice of regulation).
38. The actual opportunity to acquire notice is not limited, however, to the 30
days after the final regulations are promulgated. The Secretary must publish any
proposed plan or implementing regulation in the Federal Register prior to promulgation, giving interested persons at least 45 days to comment and thus extending the
period of constructive notice. FCMA § 305(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a) (West Supp.
1977). Furthermore, the Secretary has the authority to schedule a full rulemaking
hearing prior to the promulgation of any plan or regulation. Id. § 305(b), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1855(b). In such instances an affected party might have even greater opportunity
to acquire notice, and an aggrieved party will be more likely to have actual notice of
an adverse regulation. This extended duration would also make it more reasonable to
find constructive notice to be binding.
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of the FCMA are sufficient legal notice to start the thirty-day limit
running, constitutional challenges to the promulgated regulations
should also be precluded. For the thirty-day period to withstand due
process attack, it must be reasonable.3 9 If it is reasonable to preclude
non-constitutional challenges after thirty days, it would also seem reasonable to preclude constitutional challenges. 4 0 In other words, if
Congress can successfully withdraw jurisdiction to review administrative regulations from the courts after thirty days it can do so for all
41
issues.
2.

Collateralattack on a regulationas a defense in an enforcement
proceeding

A fisherman or other party could collaterally challenge the validity
of a regulation if he violates it42 and has a civil enforcement proceeding brought against him, even though the thirty-day period has
39. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1944).
40. Constitutional infirmities are not necessarily any more serious than failure to
comply with statutory requirements. For example, it could be far more serious for a
Regional Council to grossly miscalculate the optimum yield of a fishery than to deny
an affected party his procedural due process rights in a rulemaking proceeding.
The FCMA purports only to limit challenges of regulations promulgated under the
statute, not challenges to the legislation itself. Thus, although the Supreme Court
has held that in such a situation there can be no preclusion of review of the constitutionality of the legislation, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), "this does
not disturb the rule that decisions . . . made under the statute" are unreviewable to
the extent Congress prescribes. Perry v. United States, 527 F.2d 629, 636 n.5 (Ct. Cl.
1975). Accord, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
41. An exception to the general validity of a legislative denial of review is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System. 393
U.S. 233 (1968). In the companion case of Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968),
the Court had held that conditioning judicial review on the risk of incurring a substantial penalty in an enforcement proceeding did not amount to "no review at all"
and did not violate due process guarantees. Id. at 259. The exception to this rule, set
forth in Oestereich, is that where an agency makes a "clear departure . . . from its
statutory mandate" or acts in a "blatantly lawless manner," a court will entertain review of the action. 393 U.S. at 238. Accord, Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No.
16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). See also Hykel v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.. 317 F.
Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
42. See, e.g., United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952) (in absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, failure to pursue an administrative remedy does
not preclude a defendant in an enforcement proceeding from challenging the validity
of a regulation). Accord, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). In this case
the Supreme Court held that if an aggrieved party failed to contest the validity of a
war time price regulation within the prescribed time in the Emergency Court of Appeals, it could not challenge the regulation in an enforcement procedure in a federal
district court. The Court held that because Congress intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Emergency Court of Appeals to determine the validity of any regulation or order promulgated under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the federal district courts had no such authority. In contradistinction, the FCMA does not
provide separate courts for preenforcement review and enforcement proceedings.
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run. 43 Section 305(d) merely precludes direct attack on the regulation
within thirty days of promulgation; it makes no mention of barring
collateral attack in an enforcement proceeding. 44 Because Congress
could have raised such a bar, it would be inappropriate for a court to
rebut the presumption of reviewability 45 and bar such an attack by
implication. 46 Furthermore, the opportunity for such collateral attack
may be sufficient to make the otherwise restricted review procedure
"meaningful" for due process purposes.
The consequences of failing to meet the thirty-day limitation are
magnified when it is realized that only those persons who will be in a
position to violate the regulations will have a chance to collaterally
attack them. Thus, for example, conservationists who claim that the
regulations overestimate the optimum yield, or sport fishermen who
claim that their interests were not taken into account, may have no
opportunity to assert a regulation's invalidity after the thirty-day period. If it is true, as some observers believe, that industry interests are
dominant among appointed members of the Regional Councils, 47 such
a result could further favor the interests of the industry at the possible
expense of environmental, consumer, and other interests. Furthermore,
when a party is in the position of having neither actual notice of a
regulation nor opportunity to attack a regulation collaterally in an
enforcement proceeding, the argument that there has been a deprivation of the due process right to a meaningful hearing is greatly
strengthened.
3.

Challengesbased on informationacquired after thirty days
Instances may arise where the grounds for challenging an imple-

43.

FCMA §§ 308, 310, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1858, 1860 (West Supp. 1977). Any per-

son prosecuted for a criminal offense under § 309, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859, would not be
in a position to collaterally attack a regulation, because none of the offenses proscribed therein deal with violations of regulations per se.
44. In this regard the FCMA noticeably differs from the FWPCA and Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1970. See note 27 supra. The FWPCA states: "Action of the

Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review in any civil or
criminal proceeding for enforcement." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Nearly identical language was used in the Clean Air Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
45. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
46.

See, e.g., Hykel v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.

Pa. 1970).
47. See Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications
of the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REv. 641 (1977).

607

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 599, 1977

menting regulation or management plan do not exist until the thirtyday period for review has expired. In such cases, section 305(d) provides little help. 4 8 On its face, this section would seem to preclude any
review of the matter; however, section 302 of the Act provides that
the Regional Councils are required to "review on a continuing basis,
and revise as appropriate" the assessment and specification of optimum yield, as well as the capacity and the harvest of the fishery by
both foreign and domestic fishermen. 49 Although this section does not
expressly require a Council to review the more detailed regulations, if
any, which it proposed to the Secretary,5 0 such review could arguably
be required. 5 1 More importantly, if a Regional Council should fail to
revise a plan or regulation despite changed conditions, the Secretary
52
has the authority to do so.
The Act thus clearly provides an administrative structure to remedy
any shortcomings of management schemes made visible by newly
acquired information. When such information becomes available, an
aggrieved party should be barred from directly challenging a plan or
regulation in a judicial proceeding until he has exhausted the available
administrative remedies. 53 The reasons for requiring exhaustion in

48. The Act makes no reference to such a situation. In comparison, both the
FWPCA and Clean Air Amendments provide for judicial review of regulations after
the 30- or 90-day time limit has expired, if the petition is based solely on grounds
arising after the limit has expired. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. 111 1973);
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
49. FCMA § 302(h)(5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(5) (West Supp. 1977).
50. Section 302(h)(5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(5), only requires review of assessments and specifications made pursuant to § 303(a)(3) and (4), not § 303(b). Section
303(b) contains the discretionary provisions within a Regional Council's authority,
including, inter alia, catch and gear restrictions and limited access systems.
51. Section 302(h)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(6), states that each Council shall
"conduct any other activities which are required by, or provided for in, this Act or
which are necessary and appropriateto the foregoing functions." (emphasis added).
52. Section 304(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c) provides: "The Secretary may prepare ...
any amendment to [a fishery management] plan ... if-(A) the appropriate Council
fails to develop and submit to the Secretary, after a reasonable period of time . . . any
The Secretary's authority to promulgate
necessary amendment to such a plan ....
regulations is found at id. § 305(g), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(g).
53. The Supreme Court has stated: "The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine
is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its expertise, and to
correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405
U.S. 34, 37 (1972).
The distinction between the management plan and implementing regulations may
be significant vis-a-vis the exhaustion doctrine. The primary responsibility for creation
and review of the plans is with the Regional Councils, and arguably they should thus
be the bodies to which any claim of a material change in conditions should be brought.
On the other hand, because primary responsibility for promulgation of regulations
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such circumstances are: (1) The Secretary has authority to amend the
plans and implementing regulations; (2) the risk of irreparable injury
from pursuit of the administrative remedy is not likely to be greater
than from pursuit of a judicial remedy; and (3) the subject matter involves specialized administrative understanding, and the5 4 administration should be allowed to evaluate the relevant facts first.
The Act provides little guidance to a party adversely affected by the
failure of the Secretary to amend or promulgate a regulation in response to newly acquired information. 55 However, because the thirtyday limit applies only to promulgated regulations,5 6 there would be no
time bar to challenging a decision by the Secretary not to act on new
information. 57 In such a case of administrative inaction, an affected
party could petition the reviewing court to order the Secretary or Regional Council to consider the new information and to give a statement of reasons for its inaction. In extreme circumstances, the court
58
might consider deciding the substantive issues itself.

Challenges to management schemes based upon newly acquired
information, as discussed above, should be distinguished from situations in which either the Regional Councils or the Secretary possessed
the information in issue but did not make it publicly available. If such
information becomes available, and if it is relevant and could have
had a significant effect on the content of the regulations, it should be
allowed to serve as the basis for challenge to the management
scheme's validity. In such a situation the reviewing court should equitably toll the thirty-day limit 59 and review the regulations on the basis
of the whole record, including the information that had been withheld.
rests with the Secretary, requesting the Secretary to alter a regulation in light of
newly acquired information would seem sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies.
54.

See 1 K. DAvIS, supranote 32, § 20.03, at 652-53 (Supp. 1970).

55. The refusal or failure of the Secretary to consider a challenge to a regulation
or plan could be overturned by a reviewing court as arbitrary and capricious action,
or an abuse of discretion. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
56. FCMA § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp. 1977).
57. The rationale supporting the 30-day limit is prevention of delay in implementing the fishery management program by requiring prompt resolution of contested
issues. See text accompanying note 29 supra. This rationale does not exist in a situation of administrative inaction, because judicial review of a decision not to act
could in no way impair a management program.
58. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); see generally Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66
MICH. L. REv. 1423 (1968).
59. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
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Removal of the Reviewing Court's Power to Enjoin

In addition to limiting judicial review to those challenges brought
within thirty days of a regulation's promulgation, section 305(d) of the
Act also provides that "section 705 [of the Administrative Procedure
Act] is not applicable,"6 0 thereby depriving a reviewing court of the
authority to enjoin the implementation of a contested regulation

pending judicial review. 61 Deprivation of the injunctive remedy is particularly significant to affected fishing interests and the regulatory
authority. Issuance of preliminary injunctions could result in substan-

tial harm to a fish stock by permitting unregulated fishing practices.
On the other hand, review of a regulation without an injunctive
remedy may easily last longer than a fishing season and thus result in

irreparable injury to a fisherman. 62
It appears well settled that congressional limitation of a reviewing
court's power to grant particular remedies is constitutionally valid if
the opportunity for ultimate judicial determination of the regulation's

validity is adequate. 63 As Professor Hart stated:
The denial of any remedy is one thing. . . . But the denial of one
remedy while another is left open, or the substitution of one for another, is very different. It must be plain that Congress necessarily has
60. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp. 1977). Section 705 of the APA provides
in part:
On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent
irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to which a case may
be taken on appeal ....
may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending
conclusion of the review proceedings.
5 U.S.C. § 705 (1970).
61. The Conference Report on the Act stated:
Regulations to implement a fishery management plan are subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. ch. 7) if a petition for
judicial review of such regulations is filed within 30 days after the date of promulgation except that the reviewing court is without authority to enjoin the implemnentation of those regulationspending the judicial review ....
S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 37, 90 (emphasis added). Thus, the power to stay implementing regulations lies exclusively in the Secretary. FCMA § 305(b)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b)(A)
(West Supp. 1977).
62. Cf.Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 87
Wn. 2d 417, 553 P.2d 113 (1976), wherein it was stated that "[il
n legal controversies
involving the validity of fishing regulations, the time between action and effect is
usually so compressed that the issues are moot before the appellate process can be
fully utilized." Id. at 422, 553 P.2d at 116 (Utter, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). See also
notes 65-68 infra.
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a wide choice in the selection of remedies, and that a complaint about
64
action of this kind can rarely be of constitutional dimension.
In Bob Jones University v. Simon,65 a university which concededly
refused to admit black students brought an action to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from revoking a ruling letter declaring that the
institution qualified for tax-exempt status, and from withdrawing advance assurance that contributions to the institution would be characterized as charitable. The government argued that the Anti-Injunction
Act removed the reviewing court's jurisdiction to issue a preliminary
injunction. Although the Supreme Court recognized the potential for
irreparable injury to the university from the IRS action, it held that
Congress has the power to deny a reviewing court the authority to
enjoin a regulation pending review, even when substantial irreparable
injury may occur to the petitioner. 66 Furthermore, the Court subsequently held that the constitutional nature of a petitioner's claim is of
67
no consequence under a statute denying injunctive authority.
The rule stated in Bob Jones was based upon protecting the government's interest in assessing and collecting taxes "as expeditiously as
possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference. ' 68
Because the interest of the government in managing depletable
common property resources with a minimum of preenforcement interference is at least as strong as the IRS interest in Bob Jones, it would
seem that the FCMA's denial of preliminary injunctive relief similarly
should be upheld.
The Supreme Court, however, has fashioned two exceptions when
injunctions will be granted despite a statute purporting to bar the injunctive remedy. First, when an agency fails to follow statutory procedural requirements, an aggrieved party may sue for injunctive relief.69 Second, vhen equity jurisdiction otherwise exists-that is, there
is a clear showing of irreparable harm, and "it is clear that under no
64.

Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An

Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1366 (1953). See also Bob Jones Univ.
v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,746 (1974).
65. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
66. Id. at 748. This rule has been upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976); United States v. American
Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974). See also Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United
States, 537 F.2d 417 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
67. United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974).
68. 416 U.S. at736.
69. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 184 (1976).
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circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail"-a court
may enjoin enforcement of a contested regulation.70 The Supreme
Court recently expanded the second exception: although the petitioner
still has the burden of proving irreparable injury, the government
must litigate the question of whether the regulation has a basis in
fact. 71 Thus, while more than a good faith allegation by the government is now required, these judicial exceptions remain "narrow situa72
tions of infrequent occurrence.
A party challenging a regulation promulgated under the FCMA will
rarely fall within one of these exceptions. First, the procedural requirements placed on the Councils and the Secretary are limited in
scope. The primary procedural duty of the Councils is to conduct
public hearings so as to allow all interested persons an opportunity to
be heard. 73 The Secretary's principal procedural duty is to publish
proposed regulations in the Federal Register and allow comment for
at least forty-five days. Hearings on the proposed regulations are discretionary,7 4 and therefore absence or denial of such a hearing would
not fall within the procedural exception to the injunction prohibition.
Second, for a substantive challenge to be grounds for an injunction,
the government must have no chance ultimately to prevail. Because of
the breadth of discretion granted to the Councils and the Secretary for
the purpose of management, 75 it is unlikely that an injunction could
76
be obtained on substantive grounds.
70. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, (1962). In
Williams Packing, the Court also stated that a court should give "the most liberal
view of the law and the facts," because "[t] o require more than good faith on the
part of the Government would unduly interfere with [the objectives of the act] ." Id.
at 7. In applying this test, the Court has made clear that the "inadequacy of available
remedies goes only to the existence of irreparable injury, an essential prerequisite for
traditional equity jurisdiction, but only one of the two parts of the Williams Packing
test." United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974).
71. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976) (government must disclose the
information which was the basis for its action). See also Solitron Devices, Inc. v.
United States, 537 F.2d 417, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1976), where the court stated that Shapiro
stands for the proposition that a mere good faith allegation by the government is not
sufficient. Compare the earlier statement by the Court in Williams Packing, supra
note 70.
72. Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 417, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
73. FCMA § 302(h)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
74. Id. § 305(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b).
75. See, e.g., id. §§ 3(2), 3(18), 301, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802(2), 1802(18), 1851. See
also 41 Fed. Reg. 39,441-45 (1976).
76. For example, a litigant ultimately might succeed in proving that "the best scientific information available" was not used in formulating implementing regulations.
However, no injunction would lie unless the challenger proved that the government
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The denial of a reviewing court's authority to enjoin regulations preliminarily has another significant effect. The Secretary has the authority to promulgate emergency regulations which may last up to
ninety days, but there is no provision requiring that an affected party
or the Regional Councils be afforded a hearing or an opportunity to
comment on such action. 77 With preliminary injunctive relief unavailable, there seems to be no effective means to review such regulations
78
except in those rare situations discussed above.
IV.

PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES TO FISHERY
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES

Because the procedures which an administrative agency uses in
making its regulatory determinations may be critical in the formulation of a management program, it is essential for a reviewing court to
be satisfied that the agency has strictly adhered to the procedures dictated by the authorizing legislation, the Constitution, and judicial
policy. After first discussing the required and discretionary procedures
which the FCMA imposes on the Councils and the Secretary, this Part
suggests potential bases for procedural challenges to fishery management schemes, and predicts the probable resolution of such challenges.
A.

Administrative Proceduresand the Role of the Regional Councils
under the FCMA
The FCMA requires each Regional Council to:
conduct public hearings, at appropriate times and in appropriate locations in the geographical area concerned, so as to allow all interested
persons an opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management plans and amendments to such plans, and with respect to the
administration and implementation of the provisions of this Act.79

could under no circumstances prevail. Even though the government must disclose the

information upon which it based the regulation, this is a heavy burden, especially in
the preliminary stages of a court proceeding.
77. FCMA § 305(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(e) (West Supp. 1977).
78. Summary judgment generally would not be available as a remedy, because to
prevail the moving party must establish that there is no "genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). It is unlikely that there would be no contested issues of fact in
a challenge to an emergency regulation.
79. FCMA § 302(h)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
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The term "public hearing" is not defined by the Act, but both the legislative history8 0 and analogous case law81 indicate that the term
expands the informal rulemaking procedures of section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 82 to include a right to oral presentation. The present procedure of the Councils recognizes this
83
and includes such an opportunity.
Less clear is the point in the development of the management plans
at which such hearings are required. The present language of the Act
appears to be a compromise between the House bill, which would
have used hearings basically as a means of acquiring information for
the Councils, 84 and the Senate bill, which granted interested parties an
opportunity to comment on both the management plan and proposed
regulations. 8 5 The result under the FCMA is that parties may be heard
"at appropriate times . ..in the development [and amendment] of
fishery management plans" and "with respect to the administration
86
and implementation of the provisions of the Act."
After a management plan is prepared by a Council, the Secretary
80.

See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975), reprinted in

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 1051, 1117-18.

81. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). In this case the
court construed the requirement in the Clean Air Act that a "public hearing" be held
before the EPA could promulgate a state implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c)
(1970). The court found that the term "public hearing" expanded the minimum requirements of informal rulemaking by including a right to oral presentation. 504 F.2d
at 660 n.15. See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Section 553(c) provides in part:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the ruling making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in
the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.

83. Interview with Professor Donald McKernan, Institute of Marine Studies,
University of Washington (member North Pacific Regional Council) in Seattle (May
4, 1977).
84. House Bill provided: "Each Council shall-(A) solicit, by means of public
hearings to the extent practicable, and evaluate on a continuing basis, comments and
recommendations from all interested persons in the geographical area concerned with
respect to the administration and implementation of the provisions of this Act." H.R.
200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(g)(1) (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 753, 792.
85. Senate Bill 961 provided that each Council "shall conduct public hearings, at
appropriate times and in appropriate locations, so as to allow all interested persons
an opportunity to be heard on (A) the overall fishery management plan; (B) any separate management program; (C) recommended regulations; and (D) any amendments
to regulations." S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(c)(7) (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 699, 710.
86. FCMA § 302(h)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
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approves or disapproves the plan.8 7 If approved, it is published in the
FederalRegister along with any accompanying regulations which may
be approved or prepared by the Secretary. 88 Following publication,
interested parties must be afforded at least forty-five days to submit
written "data, views, or comments."8 9 It is then within the discretion
of the Secretary whether to schedule a hearing in accordance with section 553 of the APA on the proposed management plan or regulations. 9 0
B. The Role of the Secretary
1.

The decision to hold a hearing

Like any exercise of discretion, the Secretary's decision whether to
hold a hearing on a proposed regulation or management plan may be
reversed by a reviewing court if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. 91 Additionally, a body of administrative
common law has developed under which such discretion can be con87. Id. § 304(a), (b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a), (b).
88. The Regional Councils may prepare proposed regulations to implement the
management plans, and they must be approved by the Secretary. Id. § 303(c), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1853(c). The Secretary may also prepare regulations to implement the
plans, id. § 305(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a), and there is no requirement that the
Regional Councils review them prior to promulgation.
89. Id. § 305(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a).
90. Id. § 305(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b). The hearings the Secretary is empowered
to hold are procedurally less formal than those held by the Councils. The Act defines
them as § 553 notice and comment hearings under the APA, which do not require
any oral presentation. See note 82 supra.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not prevent an affected party from seeking a hearing from the Secretary, even when that party did not
raise the grounds for challenge at the Council hearing level. The exhaustion doctrine,
when applied, is used to deny judicial relief until administrative remedies have been
exhausted. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

424-58 (1965); 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 32, at § 20 (1958). In the situation discussed
here, the Secretary is the last step in the administrative process prior to judicial review, and neither the management plan nor the regulations are final. There is no significant risk of substantial delay or cost in holding a § 553 hearing, and there is no
statutory requirement that a party utilize the Council hearings. Furthermore, there
may be times when the plans or regulations finally proposed to the Secretary differ
significantly from those discussed at the Council hearings. Finally, the exhaustion
requirement is more appropriate for adjudicatory hearings than legislative rulemaking.
91. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "the reviewing court shall...
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See
Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments
in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE LJ. 51, 73; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U.
CHI. L. REV. 401, 411-12 (1975).
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fined by requiring more extensive procedures than those prescribed by
the APA or the statute governing the agency. Such action may be ordered in the interest of fairness, 92 or when the record is inadequate for
meaningful judicial review. 9 3 The Conference Report on the Act provides some guidance as to when a hearing should be held by the Secretary:
The conferees anticipate that the Secretary will not normally hold
hearings on fishery management plans prepared by the Regional
Fishery Management Councils inasmuch as the plans (and amendments thereto) are themselves the product of mandatory public hearings by the Councils. However, hearings may be appropriate in cases
(1) in which written submissions are received asserting that the proposed regulations are inconsistent with the plan to be implemented
thereby, (2) in which the plan was prepared by the Secretary himself
94
....

or (3) in which there are controverted issues of material fact.

This statement indicates, inter alia, that the conferees anticipated that
the Secretary would hold hearings on plans s/he prepared more
frequently than on plans prepared by the Councils. Despite these
guidelines, however, the statutory purpose of the discretionary hearings by the Secretary is unclear.
The legislative history is not particularly helpful in deciphering
Congress intent. The language of section 305 was derived from the
House bill, 95 the first part of which was in effect identical to the present section 305(a): it provided for the publication of proposed regula92. See, e.g., Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir.
1971), discussed at notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra; American Airlines, Inc.
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
93. See, e.g., Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir.
1976) (if an agency is going to rely on scientific literature it must specify what is employed so that affected parties and the reviewing court may trace its reasoning and
application); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Dry Colors Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of
Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA 462
F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 6, at 37, 90.
95. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 307 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 6, at 753, 803-06. Senate Bill 961 established a different but simpler procedure for the Secretary's review of proposed regulations. First, the Secretary was to
determine if the regulations were consistent with the national standards. If consistent,
the Secretary would adopt and publish them, and give a notice of proposed rulemaking. This notice was to request comment, designate the fishery regulated, summarize
the recommendations of the Councils, and describe where and why the proposed
regulations differed from those recommended by the Councils. The Secretary was
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tions and plans, and a forty-five-day minimum period for comment. 96
The present section 305(b), however, differs from the original House
bill, which provided that if any adversely affected citizen of the
United States, or any State, requested a hearing on a proposed regulation, the Secretary was requiredto hold a "public hearing" in accordance with section 553 of the APA "for the purpose of receiving infor'97
mation relevant to the matters identified in the notice of hearing.
After the hearing, the Secretary was to make a determination and include a statement of her/his reasons for the determination. 98
The present language of section 305(b) eliminates the House bill's
bar to foreign interests seeking review, the mandatory hearing upon
request by an adversely affected party, the "public hearing" language,
and the required statement of reasons for decision. Much of the purpose of the hearing provision was thus eliminated, with the result that
its only rational function can be to resolve serious disputes over the
implementing regulations and management plans which have not been
adequately resolved either at the Council level or through the fortyfive-day comment period.
Remand to the Secretary

2.

Under the bifurcated administrative structure of the FCMA, the
Secretary is the final arbiter in the promulgation of fishery management measures, as s/he must approve all management plans and implementing regulations. Furthermore, the Secretary is responsible for
ensuring that the management schemes are consistent with legislative
standards, that the reviewing court is presented with an adequate record, and that affected parties have an opportunity both to be informed
of and to contest proposed management measures. As a result, any
procedural or substantive defects found by a court should be returned
to the Secretary for curative action. 99 In this respect, the Secretary
also authorized to promulgate regulations independently of the Councils. See S. 961,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(c),(d) (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 6, at 699; 712-13.
96. See H.R. 200, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 307 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 6, at 753, 803-06.
97.

Id. § 307(c). The hearing requirements for the Regional Councils were set

forth in id. § 303(g), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 6, at 792-93.

98. Id. § 307(c), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 804.
99. In many situations a remand to the Secretary for explanation may be sufficient to assure the court that the action taken was proper. But in those situations
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may act as a buffer between the courts and the Regional Councils.
Remand to the Secretary, who is backed by the technical expertise of
the National Marine Fisheries Service, will remedy defects in a management scheme more expeditiously than beginning the administrative
process anew by remand to the Councils. The following is a discussion
of several potential areas in which procedural defects may arise and
thus where it would be appropriate for a reviewing court to remand a

contested regulation to the Secretary.
a.

Fairness and administrativebias

"The most basic concept of conflict-of-interest regulation . . . is
that a public official should not be in the position of acting for the
Government where his private economic interests are involved."100
Although in theory a person with such a conflict of interest should be
disqualified from the decisional process, 10 1 the FCMA appears to

create just such a situation, because persons representing interests of
the fishing industry constitute a substantial proportion of the membership of the eight Regional Councils. 102 The issue remains as to how a
10 3
reviewing court should deal with this legislatively-created situation.
where the issue raised is one which neither the Secretary nor the Regional Council
fully confronted, a reviewing court may determine that only a remand for further
hearings will be adequate. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665
(1st Cir. 1974).
100. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1113.
1129 (1963). The conflict problem has been analyzed as a tension between two
interests:
[0] ne is the interest of the government official (and of the public) in the proper
administration of his office; the other is the official's interest in his private economic affairs. A conflict of interest exists whenever these two interests clash,
or appear to clash.
A conflict of interest does not necessarily presuppose that action by the official favoring one of these interests will be prejudicial to the other, nor that the
official will in fact resolve the conflict to his own personal advantage rather than
the government's. . . . [Blut the experience of centuries indicates that the contrary is more likely, and that affairs should be so arranged as to prevent a man
from being put in such an equivocal position.
B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 2-3 (1964).
101. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 12.03 at 153 (1958).
102. See Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications
of the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REV. 641 (1977). Professor Pontecorvo estimates
that 79% of the appointed members of the eight Regional Councils are presently
members of the fishing industry.
103. Section 302(b)(C) of the FCMA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(b)(C) (West Supp.
1977), provides that to qualify for membership on a Regional Council a person must
be "knowledgeable or experienced with regard to the management, conservation, or
recreational or commercial harvest, of the fishery resources of the geographical area

618

Judicial Review
Courts have dealt more frequently with the conflict of interest issue
in the context of adjudication' 0 4 than in the rulemaking setting. Delegation of rulemaking authority to private parties has met less judicial
resistance' 05 despite the existence of potential conflicts of interest. The
United States Supreme Court has not produced a satisfactory principle
to govern such delegation.' 0 6 The California Supreme Court, however, illustrated the division of judicial thought on this subject in the
Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners case. 10 7 The court invalidated a statute as a
standardless delegation of legislative authority, 108 but added as an
alternative basis for its decision:
[T] he statute assumes to confer legislative authority upon those who
are directly interested in the operation of the regulatory rule . . .
Where the legislature attempts to delegate its powers to an administrative board made up of interested members of the industry, the majority of which can initiate regulatory action by the board in that industry, that delegation may well be brought into question. 109
Justice Traynor, expressing the opposing view, characterized the
problem as one of legislative rather than judicial concern. 1 0
concerned." This definition of a qualified individual significantly restricts the number
of eligible persons and forms a pool of potential Council members which may be
composed predominantly of members of the fishing industry.
104. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 32, at § 12.03 (1958). The problem is
greater in the adjudicatory setting because an individual's rights to procedural due
process and a fair hearing are imperiled when the tribunal has an interest in the outcome which is adverse to that of the affected party.
105. See Liebmann, Delegation to Private Partiesin American ConstitutionalLaw,
50 IND. L.J. 650, 709 (1975).
106. See Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence,
43 U. CHI. L. REV.307, 331-35 (1976).
107. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254
P.2d 29 (1953).
108. 254 P.2d at 36. Section 301 of the FCMA sets out the standards to be followed in promulgating management plans and regulations. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (West
Supp. 1977). Although the standards are very broad and of little value as specific
guidance, they appear sufficient, in light of an abundance of precedent, to preclude
constitutional attack on the grounds of excessive or standardless delegation. See, e.g.,
Freedman, supra note 106, at 307 n.6; South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,
676-77 (1st Cir. 1974).
109. 254 P.2d at 36.
110. Justice Traynor stated:
It may be debatable whether the manifest advantages of submitting highly technical problems to an informed tribunal are outweighed by the possible danger
that an agency largely composed of members representing an interested economic group may be tempted to act for selfish ends. The Legislature is free to make
its choice.
254 P.2d at 41 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
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There are several mitigating, although not curative, factors under
the FCMA which indicate that the courts should not disturb the statutory composition of the Councils. First, all Regional Council decisions
must be reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce,"1 1 who presumably
2
can scrutinize the management plans for self-serving measures."1
Second, although the fishing industry may dominate the composition
of the Councils, it is unlikely that the various interests representing
that industry will always have the same, or even reconcilable, objectives. 11 3
A third reason courts may not become involved in the conflict of
interest issue is a judicial escape mechanism termed "the rule of necessity." This rule provides that when an administrative body is the only
body granted authority to act by the legislature, its decisions, even if
biased, will be judicially accepted." 4 Although Congress plainly intended that the Regional Councils be the bodies primarily responsible
for the promulgation of management plans, 1 5 the applicability of the
rule of necessity to Regional Council determinations under the FCMA
is doubtful because the Secretary, untouched by the conflict of interest
problem, is also given the authority to promulgate plans and regulations."",
Despite scholarly suggestion that it might be appropriate for courts
HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937). Thus, unlike the majority, which held that such delegation
to interested persons violates due process guarantees, Justice Traynor found the composition of the regulatory board to have "no constitutional significance." 254 P.2d at
40-41.
111. FCMA § 304, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854 (West Supp. 1977).
112. A difficulty with this argument is that the effects of the conflict of interest
may not be detectable from the face of the management plan, and thus remain uncorrected. See W. GELLItORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS
962 (6th ed. 1974).
113. For example, while commercial and recreational fishing interests may coincide on the issue of the permissible catch by foreign fleets, they easily could differ
on other issues, such as gear or seasonal restrictions. Similarly, fishermen and canners
may have inconsistent interests on various issues.
114. See McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for
Judicial Review, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1257. 1261-62, 1298 (1974); W. GELLHORN & C.
BYSE, supra note 112, at 960-62; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 32, § 12.04. Justification
for the rule is significantly weakened when criminal sanctions may attach to violation of the regulatory scheme. See Liebmann, supra note 105, at 711. However, there
are no criminal penalties under the FCMA for the simple violation of an implementing regulation. See FCMA § 309, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859 (West Supp. 1977).
115. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 451 (remarks of Sen. Hathaway); id. at 454-55 (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); id. at 845 (remarks of Rep. Legett).
See also Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427. 436
(1977).
116. FCMA §§ 304(c), 305; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1854(c), 1855 (West Supp. 1977).
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to forbid agencies staffed with members of a regulated industry to
promulgate standards "that promote the interests of that industry,"117
it seems on balance of all the above factors that the delegation to the
1 8 ImRegional Councils should not be disturbed by judicial action.
plicit in this judgment is the proviso that "if in fact vitiating unfairness
and prejudice do become manifest, the result. . . can be set aside" by
a reviewing court.11 9
Because the Secretary acts as intermediary between formulation
and implementation of management schemes, and has the power both
to review and promulgate measures independently of the Councils, the
courts should be able to deal with any conflict of interest problems
through close scrutiny of the record and increased reliance on the Secretary. The procedural options available to a court reviewing an apparently biased management or regulation plan thus include remand
to the Secretary for further explanation of questionable points, remand to the Secretary for further hearings on the issue, or invalidation of the management plan or regulation with a requirement that the
Secretary promulgate new measures. The selection of an option
should depend upon a challenging party's ability to demonstrate both
the substantive impact of the conflict of interest and an adverse effect
of the conflict upon himself.
In the landmark case of Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin,120 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded a
regulation limiting the size of imported tomatoes to allow an importer
the opportunity to contest the regulation's validity in an oral presenta117. McCormack, supra note 114, at 1297-98. Professor McCormack also suggests that a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973), could be a forerunner for such a proposition. Id.
118.

This is not meant to suggest that such a regulatory scheme is desirable as a

device for legislative decisionmaking. Furthermore, the New Deal legislation invalidated by the Supreme Court as improper delegation of legislative authority to interested members of a regulated industry offers some interesting analogies to the structure established under the FCMA. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238

(1936); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In Schecter,
the Court responded to the government's argument that it was availing itself of the
assistance of "'representative members of that industry ... the persons most vitally

concerned and most familiar with its problems,'" 295 U.S. at 537, by stating that
such delegation is "utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties
of Congress." Id. Compare note 103 supra. In Carter Coal, the Court characterized

the delegation of regulatory authority to producers in the regulated industry as "an
intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property." 298 U.S. at 311.
119.

120.

W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, stpra note 112, at 962.

449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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tion to Department of Agriculture officials. The statutory rulemaking
procedure restricted the importer's challenge to a committee dominated by domestic agricultural producers, and thus the court found
that fairness required an additional hearing:
This conclusion [to require an oral hearing before the Secretary] is
undergirded by basic considerations of fairness arising out of the
framework of the restriction, a statutory pattern of self-regulation by
industry, and an assertion not palpably devoid of substance that the
approach of the domestic producers to the factual issue, which would
normally be given deference by the Secretary, is in fact a rationalized
determination of a discrimination against importers. 121

Because of the potential conflict of interest within the Regional
Councils, 12 2 the fairness doctrine of Walter Hoim could be applied to
require the Secretary to hold a hearing when noncommercial or foreign interests are able to make a potentially valid charge that a
Council has proposed self-serving measures. t2 3 Regional Council determinations as to the amount of the optimum yield available to for24
eign fishermen could easily become a hotbed for this sort of claim.'
121. Id. at 1016. Judge Leventhal, the author of the Walter Holm opinion, has
also advocated additional procedures in the interest of fairness in other legal literature.
See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking atid the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 509, 537-40 (1974). For different perspective on fairness by another
judge, see Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 379-81 (1974).
122. See Pontecorvo, supra note 102. at 652.
123. The distinction between regulations affecting domestic and foreign fishing
was recognized by Congress in a context which supports the concept of guarding
foreign interests from possible Regional Council prejudice. In its report on the Senate
bill, the Senate Committee on Commerce stated: "Clearly, writing regulations
which would apply to foreign fishing is more properly a function of the Federal
government, rather than the councils. It is expected, therefore, that the Secretary
will have more discretion with regard to these regulations to insure that they are
compatible with U.S. international obligations." S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 40 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 693.
124. FCMA § 303(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a) (West Supp. 1977). The allocation to foreign fishermen could be reduced in three ways. First, the Councils could
refuse to allocate fully the amount of the optimum yield that American vessels would
not harvest. However, this seems abusive and capricious, and contrary to legislative
intent. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 899 (remarks of Rep. Ruppe).
See also Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Managenlent Act of 1976: First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427
(1977). Second, the capacity of American fishing vessels to harvest the optimum yield
could be overestimated. Third, the optimum yield figure itself could be underestimated,
thus reducing the amount of fish available to foreign fishermen. This distortion would
be the most difficult to remedy because it would be more difficult for a foreign fisherman to rebut the defenses of conservation and caution in managing depletable resources.
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At the very minimum, an allegation that a plan or regulation has been
affected by a conflict of interest should place a greater burden on the
Secretary to justify not holding a hearing.
b.

Ensuring an adequate recordforjudicial review

An essential role of judicial review of legislative rulemaking is to
ensure that the administrative agency has engaged in "reasoned decision-making"'125 and has exercised a "reasoned discretion."'1 26 Without
an adequate record a reviewing court will be unable to meet this task,
and should remand the regulation to the agency for such further action as is necessary to convince the court that the agency has reasonably dealt with all material facts and issues.' 27 This requirement of an
adequate record will be examined here to determine when the Secretary may be required to hold hearings on fishery management
schemes. As will be seen, the outcome of this determination may depend on whether the Secretary or a Regional Council prepared the
management scheme.
The record for judicial review includes "virtually all the relevant
' 28
materials that an administrator has utilized as a basis for action.'
Thus, the courts have regarded the information produced by informal
29
rulemaking procedures as an integral part of the record for review.'

125.

See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
126.

See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

127. Generally, in such situations a regulation remains in effect during the administrative agency's reconsideration of the record on remand. See, e.g., Public
Serv. Comm. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 338, 342 n.14, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
128. Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemak-

ing, 26 AD. L. REv. 199, 209 (1974). The reviewing court "must have not merely
that full articulation of the agency's reasoning, but it must also have . . . 'the full
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."' Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973). For a
discussion of the importance of the Scientific and Statistical Committees in providing
a record for review, see Alverson, The Role of Conservation and Fishery Science
Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV.

723 (1977).
129.

See, e.g., Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 817

(D.C. Cir. 1975); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238,

1262 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 283 (1974); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Professor Nathanson notes that
the minimum procedural requirements of informal rulemaking, originally instruments
for the education of the administrator, are now used by the courts as the basis of
judicial review. See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing
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In order to facilitate meaningful judicial review, moreover, the administrative agency under both the APA 3 0o and recently fashioned
common law1 3 1 must furnish, in addition to the record, an explanation of underlying factual and policy determinations relevant to the
ultimate agency decision. Detailed explanation by the agency of every
step in the administrative process is unnecessary because a reviewing
court must "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's
1 32
path may reasonably be discerned."
In the context of voluminous factual records which the regulations
and management plans under the FCMA will generate, there are two
reasons for requiring more than a generalized statement of reasons.
First, the absence of a specific explanation places too great a burden
on affected parties to ascertain and challenge the basis of the management determination. Second, requiring such an explanation prevents
agency post hoc rationalizations that do not reflect agency reasoning
1 33
at the time of implementation.
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure
Act and Other FederalStatutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754-58 (1975).
130. Section 553 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), provides that after receiving written comments, the agency "shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose." This originally did not require a detailed statement of findings of fact: "findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
necessary. Nor is there required an elaborate analysis of the rules or of the considerations upon which the rules were issued." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947).

It appears, however, that this is precisely what the courts now require. For example, in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court stated that
the requirement of a "concise general statement" of "basis and purpose":
must be sufficiently detailed and informative to allow a searching judicial scrutiny
of how and why the regulations were actually adopted. . . . In particular, the
statement must advert to administrative determinations of a factual sort to the
extent required for a reviewing court to satisfy itself that none of the regulatory
provisions were framed in an "arbitrary" or "capricious" manner.
Id. at 739.
131. For example, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), the court remanded EPA air quality standards and required the Administrator "to supply an implementing statement that will enlighten the court" as to how
the EPA reached the standard from the material before it. The court did not base
this requirement on the APA "basis and purpose" statement, see note 130 supra,
but rather "in aid of the judicial function, centralized in this court, of expeditious
disposition of challenges to standards." 462 F.2d 850. See also Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 881 (lst Cir. 1973).
132. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
286 (1974). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 537
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
133. Administrative agencies' post hoc rationalizations to support agency actions
are forbidden. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168-69 (1962); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 634
(2d Cir. 1976).
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The Conference Report on the FCMA suggested that it may be
appropriate for the Secretary to hold hearings on proposed plans or
regulations when the management measure was prepared by the Secretary her/himself. 134 If the record in such a case was created solely by
the Secretary without benefit of "public hearings," it may present the
most likely situation for a court to find a record inadequate to support a
plan or regulation. The procedure of receiving only written comments
can produce an adequate record for review only when the Secretary
(a) provides affected parties the opportunity to comment on all material issues embodied in or produced by a regulation, 135 (b) gives notice
of and makes available all information the agency finally decides to

rely on in promulgating the measures,

36

(c) responds to all material

comments made regarding the validity of the management standards
or the findings relied upon in their formulation, 3 7 and (d) specifically
38
explains the final administrative determination.'
Nevertheless, the burden on the Secretary to substantiate regulatory
decisions, and therefore the extent of required procedure and record,
varies depending upon whether a party's challenge is to a "factual"
determination or a "policy" determination. 39 Some decisions made by
134.

S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in LEGIS-

LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 37, 90.

135. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640-41
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (not only may a party challenge the bases of a regulation, but
the effect of the regulation on the regulated industry may also be a grounds for
challenge).
136. In South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659-60 (1st Cir. 1974),
the court held that the EPA satisfied this requirement when it stated in its published
notice of rulemaking that technical documents upon which it relied were available.
See also National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 779 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 n.67 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.01-1, at 170 (1976); Wright, supra note 121, at 380-81.

When an administrative body wishes to incorporate evidence from a source outside
the immediate proceeding, it must provide interested parties with notice and an opportunity to comment on all such evidence. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
137. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1196 (3d Cir. 1975) (failure
to investigate and resolve serious economic questions raised by objecting parties was
arbitrary and capricious). Atccord, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
138. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explanation of required basis and purpose statement in informal rulemaking). Nevertheless,
review does not hinge solely on such a statement, and a court may uphold an agency
determination when there is an inadequate statement "[i] n appropriate cases, if the
necessary articulation of basis for administrative action can be discerned by reference
to clearly relevant sources other than a formal statement of reasons." Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
139. The "factual" and "policy" terminology recently used by courts seems to
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the Secretary or Regional Councils will be policy choices, in which
factual information alone does not determine the choice to be made.
Such decisions involve a reasoned choice between competing demands, and if the Secretary provides "adequate reasons and explanations," the decision should be upheld.' 40 On the other hand, when a
regulatory decision is based primarily on a factual determination,
there is no reason to defer to an agency's determination if an affected
party can show that the facts are inaccurate.
Rarely, however, will implementing regulations be based exclusively on facts or policies. An additional complicating factor is that
data used in fishery management often is necessarily incomplete, resulting in the promulgation of regulations based on a combination of
policy decisions and inadequate data. This creates a situation similar
to that presented in Industrial Union v. Hodgson,1 4 1 in which the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
[S] ome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as
to them insufficient data is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination. Decision making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon
purely factual analysis. .

.

. Judicial review of inherently legislative

decisions of this sort is obviously an undertaking of different dimensions . ..
• . . [The Secretary's decision] rests in the final analysis on an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than a factual determination, concerning the relative risks of underprotection as compared to
42
overprotection.1
embody much of the distinction that Professor Davis's terminology of "legislative"
and "adjudicative" facts was meant to make. See I K. DAvis, supra note 32. § 7.02
(1958).
140. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although the
agency must provide an adequate record, policy decisions are generally "left to the
discretion and developed expertise of the agency." National Ass'n of Food Chains,
Inc. v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
141. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974). In this case, the court reviewed asbestos exposure regulations promulgated
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The exposure standard necessarily
involved difficult predictions based upon imperfect or unavailable factual information.
The court approved a strict standard although "the evidence did not establish any
one position as clearly correct." Id. at 478-79. In a statement that illustrates difficulties similar to those likely to arise under the FCMA, the court noted that "reliable
data is not currently available with respect to the precisely predictable health effect
of various levels of exposure to asbestos dust; nevertheless, the Secretary was obligated to establish some specific level as the maximum permissible exposure." Id. at 475.
142. Id. at 474-475. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 811 (1968):
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Because such legislative or policy-type decisions involve more administrative discretion and thus invoke less substantive judicial scrutiny,
the "record" tends to become more a vehicle for the agency to explain
the rationale behind a decision that a product which may be challenged as inaccurate by an affected party.
Nevertheless, some policy decisions are founded upon facts which
are ascertainable. These facts should always be subject to challenge,
and when a party can show they are inaccurate, the regulation should
be vacated or remanded to the agency. 14 3 When factual certainties do
not exist, the agency must be allowed a wider leeway subject to the
constraints that administrative prediction be "reasonable,"' 44 and that
the Secretary define the uncertainties and then "go on to identify the
considerations . . found persuasive.' 45 When the record before the
court shows that this has been done, the regulation can then be substantively reviewed. If the record does not reveal full consideration
47
and explanation, 46 the regulation must be remanded to the Secretary.
In summary, there is no inherent procedural defect in the forty-five
day period for written comments which would require the Secretary to
hold additional hearings when s/he alone promulgates management
measures. 48 But the Conference Report suggestion that such addiSociety of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 922 (1975); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 319 (5th Cir. 1974) (administrative standards upheld even though they were based on "projections, assumptions and flimsy data," where that was all that was "feasibly available"); Reserve
Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1082-84 (8th Cir. 1974).
143. See generally Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and
Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE LU. 199, 209-22.
144. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 1975)
(agency prediction overturned as unreasonable because of lack of support in the
record); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (administrator's projections are "subject to the
restraints of reasonableness").
145. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C.Cir.
1974).
146. Despite the handicaps imposed by an uncertain state of knowledge and difficult management-policy choices, adequate judicial review requires that agencies be
held to "a high standard of articulation." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). The reviewing court's authority
generally does not extend beyond vacating or remanding the administrative determination to the agency, and stating what further evidence or explanation is necessary.
Absent exigent circumstances, the court cannot "proceed by dictating to the agency
the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and ordering
the results to be reported to the court without opportunity for further consideration
on the basis of the new evidence by the agency." FPC v. Transcontinental Pipe Line,
423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976) (per curiam).
148. If parties are held to have a right to respond to comments received by the
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tional hearings "may be appropriate" is sound procedural advice,
since the required record and statement of explanation must fully explain the policy-type decisions and effectively answer all material
comments regarding a management scheme's factual foundation.
c.

Substantial difference between final and proposed rules

It appears settled that a new opportunity to comment on a proposed rule does not arise "merely because the rule promulgated by the
agency differs from the rule it proposed, partly in response to submissions. ' 14 9 Even when changes in the final regulation are "substantial,"
the regulation may be upheld if it is "in character with the original
scheme" and a "logical outgrowth of the hearing and related procedures." 150 The reasoning of the courts is that the administrative
agency must be permitted to respond flexibly to input on proposed
regulations, and that continued procedural rounds of commentary for
each change would be cumbersome and of minimal value.
In the context of informal rulemaking, perhaps the only test that
can be devised to determine whether a change is within permissible
limits is that affected parties must be adequately appraised of the subject matter proposed to be regulated and the means proposed for regulation. 151 Anytime affected persons are not adequately appraised of a
possible major alteration of a proposed regulation, it would be arbitrary and capricious for the Secretary to deny such persons an opportunity to comment on the intended alterations, either through an additional section 305(b) hearing or through an extended period for notice
and comment.
Secretary, however, difficulty may be encountered regarding notice and the 45-day
period. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.01.1, at 171 (1976).

149. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
150. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (Ist Cir. 1974). In
Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 515 F.2d 1053, 1061 (6th Cir. 1975), the court
stated that notice of proposed rulemaking is defective only when a regulation as
adopted embraces "major subjects that were not described in the notice of proposed
rulemaking."
151. For cases holding regulations invalid because notice of proposed rulemaking
did not adequately inform interested parties of the content of the regulation, see
Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and
Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972) (the fact that some
parties appreciated the relationship between the proposal and final regulations is not
relevant).
152. 5U.S.C.§§ 551-706(1970).
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d.

Additional "hybrid"procedures

The Administrative Procedure Act 1 52 divides all federal agency rulemaking into informal rulemaking under section 553, and formal "on
the record" rulemaking under sections 556 and 557. In formal rulemaking, regulations must be based on information developed "on the
record," and must be supported by substantial evidence in the record;
in addition, formal procedures such as a right to oral presentation,
rebuttal evidence, and cross-examination are mandated. 153 Under informal rulemaking, interested persons generally express their views
through written comments, and there is no right to an oral
55
presentation 5 4 or to cross-examination.
Section 305(b) of the FCMA provides that the additional hearings
the Secretary is empowered to hold are to be informal proceedings in
accordance with section 553 of the APA.' 56 Even though these minimum APA procedures comport with due process,' 57 and Congress
has prescribed additional procedures for informal rulemaking under
certain statutes, 158 there is an important line of cases in which affected
parties have been granted greater procedural rights than are required
by statute.' 59 These procedures range from a limited right of crossexamination 160 to remand for a more complete agency explanation of
6
the decision.' '
153. Id. §§ 556-557.
154. Section 553 allows for oral presentations, but the decision to hold such
hearings is within the discretion of the agency.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Adjudicating procedures under the APA "need be
applied 'only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing, prescribes
explicitly that it be "on the record."' United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972).
156. FCMA § 305(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b) (West Supp. 1977).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 242 (1973).
The Supreme Court has stated that due process does not require an oral hearing in
rulemaking even when substantial issues are raised, and that only a case-by-case determination can determine when oral presentation is required on due process grounds.
FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1949).
158. See Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability:
The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1276 (1972).
159. For discussions of the additional procedures required by the courts, see
Leventhal, supra note 121, at 536-41; Nathanson, supra note 129, at 746-62; Verkuil,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. Rv. 185 (1974); Williams,
"Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975); Wright, supra note 121, at 380-81.
160. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973); Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
161. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (general
statement requirement of § 553 of the APA inadequate).
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In InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,t 62 the Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that under a statute
providing for "public hearings," the right of cross-examination would
be extended to parties when there is "a need for cross-examination of
live witnesses on a subject of critical importance which could not be
adequately ventilated under the general procedures.' 63 Unfortunately, the court offered no guidance as to what specific issues or instances give rise to a need for such cross-examination. 1 6 4 Similarly, a

party may have a right to an oral presentation before the agency when
that is the minimum procedure which will adequately present his posi-

tion.1

65

Despite the apparent importance of InternationalHarvester and the
"hybrid" rulemaking cases of the early 1970's, there has not been a
significant increase in cases remanded for additional procedures. The
explanation may be that the "hybrid" procedural concept came under

critical scrutiny;'

66

but it is perhaps more important that the burden

of demonstrating when and why additional procedures are necessary
rests on the challenging party, 6 7 and that only in exceptional circumstances will written comments and inquiries concerning proposed regulation be inadequate to ventilate an issue fully. Accordingly, the
courts have held that hybrid procedures are not required because an
informal rulemaking procedure deals with environmental, technical,' 68 or very important issues.1 6 9 Rather, such procedures have
162. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
163. Id. at 630-31. Accord, WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968) (when "a new policy is based upon the
general characteristics of an industry, rational decision is not furthered by requiring
the agency [to utilize adjudicatory hearings and] to lose itself in an excursion into
detail").
164. The court was equally unclear in Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d
1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971), when it stated that "fairness may require an opportunity
for cross-examination on the crucial issues." See also O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d
59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) where the court stated that "cross-examination may be necessary if critical issues cannot be otherwise resolved," but found no such circumstances.
165. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter Holm
& Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
166. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 21, at 385-95.
167. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624,
633 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
168. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 660 (lst Cir. 1974);
O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
169. See Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1267 (3d Cir. 1974).
Accord, FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949) (due process
does not require oral presentation when issue raised is "substantial"). But cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973), where the court stated
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been ordered when the contested issue is a material factual determination, and oral presentation (or cross-examination) is the only practicable
way to create a record that will enable the court to determine whether
the administrative body.has taken, in Judge Leventhal's words, "a hard
'170
look at the salient problems.
It appears that the deired end-an adequate record on substantial
questions of disputed fact--can usually be achieved under the FCMA
without resort to judicially required hybrid procedures at the Secretary's level. The "public hearing" procedures of the Regional Council
generally should provide an adequate opportunity for an effective oral
presentation of position. However, if the Secretary is the promulgator,
or if a controverted issue of material fact 171 arises that has not been
adequately dealt with by a Regional Council, the hybrid procedural
requirements may then come into play to require more than minimum
APA rulemaking procedures-but only when such procedures are the
only means to create an adequate record for the reviewing court.
V.

SCOPE OF REVIEW--SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES

Before discussing the standard to be applied in substantive review
of fishery management regulations, it is necessary to establish precisely
what a court will be reviewing. The Act only provides for judicial review of "regulations promulgated by the Secretary"; there is no mechanism provided for the direct review of the management plans themselves.1 7 2 This does not mean, however, that the courts will never hear
that "public hearings" on state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act may
"include the right to more than merely the opportunity to comment" because of the
regulation's "drastic impact."
170. Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
171. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), wherein the court stated that comments by
affected parties "must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of
materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern."
The court added that the "comment ...

significance." Id.
172.

must show why the mistake was of possible

FCMA § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp. 1977). This distinction

is emphasized by the Conference Report:
The terms "fishery management plan" and "regulations" are not used inter-

changeably in this Act. In this Act, the fishery management plan is the comprehensive statement of how the fishery is to be managed, including time and area
closures, gear restrictions, and the like. "Regulations" as used in this Act, means
the regulations promulgated to implement what is contained in the fishery management plan.
S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIs-
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challenges to the plans. Instead, the opportunity to challenge a plan is
limited by requiring that a person be affected by an implementing
regulation before bringing suit. A party should then be able to challenge a plan to the extent that the regulation is based on that plan. For
example, if a party challenges a regulation limiting fishing effort based
on a management plan's determination of optimum yield, he should
have a full opportunity to challenge the optimum yield determination.
Because of the determinative effect of the management plans on many
issues involved in the promulgation of the implementing regulations, it
would be an "empty and useless thing" 17 3 to review the regulations
without scrutiny of the plans as well.
A.

The Standard of Review

The FCMA provides that a court reviewing an implementing regulation is to determine whether the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious,
74
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."'
Although Congress omitted the "substantial evidence" test as a criterion of review, 175 it is questionable whether in application the differTORY, supra note 6. at 37, 90.
173. Alabama Ass'n of Insur. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 235
(5th Cir. 1976). Professor Davis has stated: "When the facts are of central importance and might be challenged, parties adversely affected by them should have a
chance to respond to them. Clearly, whatever factual information the agency has
considered should be part of the record for judicial review of rules." K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-6, at 672-73 (1976).

174. Section 305(d) of the FCMA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West Supp. 1977), incorporates 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1970). This section of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
, of the terms of an agency
provisions, and determine the meaning or applical:
action. The reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right; [or]
(D) without observance of procedure required by law.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
175. Under the "substantial evidence" test, a reviewing court determines whether
the findings of fact underlying the administrative conclusion are based upon "such
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ence between the two tests is of much significance.' 7 6 In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,' 77 the United States Supreme
Court stated the standard for "arbitrary and capricious" review:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is
to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. 178
In applying this test, the courts generally immerse themselves in all
of the evidence in the record to determine whether the reasoning process which the agency used is sound, and whether the conclusions are
"rationally supported."'1 79 Thus, while the review is substantial, its
purpose is primarily to insure that the agency took a "hard look" at all
relevant issues and engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking," rather than
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The "substantial evidence" test, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970), was omitted from the
standards of review under the FCMA. FCMA § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West
Supp. 1977).
176. Nevertheless, the difference between the two tests, as applied by the courts,
is not substantial. See, e.g., Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155,
1158 (3d Cir. 1974); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1313
(1975); Leventhal, supra note 121, at 540; Pederson, Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 48-49 (1975). Accord, 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 32, §
29.07, at 151-52 ("Perceptive judges can hardly be expected to sustain an order because it has basis in fact if that basis does not seem to them to be substantial"). But
see Wright, supra note 121, at 392 ("If weightings on conflicting evidence need be
only 'reasonable' to pass the substantial evidence test it follows that they can be less
than reasonable and still survive the 'arbitrary, capricious' test").
Congress apparently intended to narrow the scope of review by omitting the substantial evidence test. See S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 37, 90.
177. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
178. Id. at 416 (footnotes omitted). The definition of any standard of review
is difficult "[s]ince the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings
cannot be imprisoned within any form of words ....There are no talismanic words
that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in
relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms." Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). It should be noted that there has been much
discussion of the unfortunate use of the phrase "clear error of judgment." For an
excellent discussion of the effect of that terminology, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wright, J.).
179. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972),
the Supreme Court described the scope of review of the Interstate Commerce Commission's informal rulemaking as follows: "We do not weigh the evidence .. .we do
not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations ... we inquire into the soundness of
the reasoning ... only to ascertain that the [conclusions] are rationally supported."
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to review the substance of the decisions.18 0 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit recently explained this process in the
following manner:
The close scrutiny of the evidence is intended to educate the court.
It must understand enough about the problem confronting the agency
to comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon and the evidence discarded; the questions addressed by the agency and those
bypassed; the choices open to the agency and those made. The more
technical the case, the more intensive must be the court's effort to
181
understand the evidence.
If a court is satisfied that the agency has addressed all relevant issues,
the substantive review is limited to determining whether there is a rational basis to the regulation or plan. If such a basis exists, the court
182
must affirm even if it disagrees with the agency decision.
Administrative expertise, however, is legitimate only when the
agency rationally weighs those factors and only those factors that
Congress intended it consider. Thus a reviewing court could set aside
fishery management regulations if (a) the Secretary excludes from
183
consideration a factor which Congress intended to be considered,
(b) irrational weight is given to one or more relevant factors, 184 (c) the
regulation is based upon consideration of irrelevant factors, 8 5 (d) the
180. The "hard look" rule of administrative law is explained by its creator, Judge
Leventhal, in Leventhal, supra note 121, at 511-15. For Judge J. Skelly Wright's
view, see Wright, supra note 121, at 390-95.
181. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per Wright, J.)
The court went on to add: "The immersion in the evidence is designed solely to
enable the court to determine whether the agency decision was rational and based on
consideration of the relevant factors." Id. See also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
182. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
183. This does not mean that the Councils or the Secretary must weigh equally
all factors set forth by Congress, but rather that they cannot ignore relevant factors.
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d
646 (1st Cir. 1974); Wright, supra note 121, at 379-80.
Furthermore, factors that Congress intended to be considered may be found by the
courts through construction of the statute or through implication. See, e.g., Duquesne
Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1194-96 (3d Cir. 1975), where the court held that
EPA approval of a state implementation plan under the Clean Air Act "without investigating and resolving the serious economic questions raised by the objecting companies was 'arbitrary, capricious [and] an abuse of discretion.' " Id. at 1196.
184. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 182 (1965).
185. Id. at 181. "The question of whether the action of the administrative body
is within the limits of relevance is always a question for the courts, regardless of how
reasonable the agency's conception of relevance may be." Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Substantial Evidence ol the Whole Record, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1259 (1951).
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regulation is founded upon improper purpose, 186 or (e) there is no reliable evidence supporting the Secretary's decision. 18 7 Such acts constitute abuse of discretion because the agency is no longer acting
within the scope and protection of its legislative mandate. The agency's value as an expert body-the basis of judicial deference-is dissipated; furthermore, arbitrary implementation or application of a
188
statute is contrary to due process.
A matter of particular importance under the Act is determining
when the Regional Councils' and the Secretary's interpretations of the
18 9
Act's management provisions are within the legislative mandate.
The Supreme Court has stated that where there is no factual dispute,
the test to determine whether an administrative agency has exceeded
its delegated authority is that "the validity of a regulation. . . will be
sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation.' "190 A party attacking a regulation on the ground
that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the enabling legislation has a
difficult burden of proof due to the deference often accorded the administrative interpretation of the statutory scheme.' 9 1 This deference
186. See, e.g., Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1883), where Congress had authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to provide for duty free admission of animals
specially imported for breeding purposes "under such regulations as he may prescribe." A regulation was promulgated that required the official concerned to be
"satisfied that the animals are of superior stock adapted to improving the breed in the
United States," before admitting such animals without charge. Id. at 466. This was
held invalid as an attempt by the Secretary to use his authority for a purpose other
than what the legislature intended. See also Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C.
1973).
187. See, e.g., First Girl, Inc. v. Regional Manpower Admin., 499 F.2d 122
(7th Cir. 1974).
188. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (1966). Because laws which are arbitrary and capricious
violate due process, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), the application of a law which is arbitrary and capricious should similarly be invalid. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
189. The Act's management standards are discussed in Christy, The Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976: Management Objectives and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs, 52 WASH. L. REV. 657 (1977), and Alverson, The
Role of Conservation and Fishery Science Under the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV.723 (1977).
190. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). See
also Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), where the agency
promulgated regulations under a statute providing an exemption from the minimum
wage law for "any individual within the area of production" as defined by the Administrator. The regulations established a geographical test, but also indicated that
the exemption would not apply if the number of employees in the establishment
exceeded seven. The Court held this regulation invalid, ruling that a numerical test
was inconsistent with the intent of Congress.
191. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Talley v. Mathews, 550
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to the implementing agency's interpretation may be magnified when
the statute is new,1 92 when the state of knowledge of the regulated
subject matter is incomplete, or when a challenged regulation is part
of a technical, scientific, or economic management scheme.' 93 All
three factors weigh in favor of deference to the decisions of the Regional Councils and Secretary under the FCMA.
It is within this framework of carefully defined deference to the
administrative bodies and close judicial scrutiny of the record' 94 that
the Regional Councils and the Secretary will attempt to implement
their broad legislative instructions. To illustrate the variables which
may affect management determinations and which will ultimately involve judicial scrutiny and guidance, a hypothetical example regarding the determination of optimum yield will be analyzed. It does
not propose to give answers to the issues which may arise in making
such a determination, but is intended only to illustrate the points
at which the courts may get involved.
The FCMA requires the Regional Councils to determine the optimum yield for a fishery.1 95 The optimum yield (OY) is defined as:
the amount of fish(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation,
with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.' 96
The first stage in defining this figure is determining the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Although this is not always a readily determinable figure, it should be roughly definable. The first issue a court will
face is whether this biological determination (MSY) is consistent with
F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977); Florida v. Mathews, 526 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir.
1976); Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 844
(5th Cir. 1974).
192. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 31 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
193. See, e.g., Graham v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 530 F.2d 317, 319 (8th
Cir. 1976).
194. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
195. FCMA § 303(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
196. Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18). The Regional Councils must prepare a
summary of the information used in making such specifications. This summary must
consist of more than conclusory statements as it will serve as the basis of judicial
review of optimum yield determinations. See Part III-B-2 supra.
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the national standard requiring that "the best scientific information
available" be used.' 9 7 Then the court must decide if the administrative
weighing of the information was rational.
The next set of issues the court will face relates to the modification
of the MSY by "any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."
First, the court must determine whether the modifying factor used was
relevant. 198 Second, the court must determine whether that factor, if
relevant, was based on "the best scientific information available."' 199
Third, the court must decide if the factor was rationally used in
varying the MSY. Finally, the court may be faced with assertions that
one or several factors were not considered by the Councils, or if considered, were not given adequate consideration. Thus, all of these issues will receive a very close scrutiny from the courts, but only so far
as to satisfy the court that the Councils and Secretary engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking" and that the scheme is supported by a rational
00
basis.2
B.

The Burden of Proof

The allocation of the burden of proof in a judicial challenge to a
management plan or implementing regulation may be of central im197. FCMA § 301(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977). One of the
Senate Reports on the Act shed some light on this standard:
If little is known about the size of the stock or environmental effects on other
stocks or similar relationships .... even the best management scheme will fail.
Therefore another primary goal must be to achieve the best available scientific
information about the stocks. The term "scientific information" is meant to include not only biological and ecological data but also econonic and sociological
informationas well.

S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 6, at 653, 685 (emphasis added).

For a construction of the term "best scientific evidence available" as used in the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975), see
Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The court there found an obligation for the National Marine Fisheries Service
to produce reliable data as a condition for permitting tuna fishermen to incidently take
porpoises, even though NMFS stated that it would take three to seven years to

acquire scientifically valid information as to the actual populations of porpoises, the
optimum sustainable populations, or the effect of the taking on the optimum sustainable population.
198.

See note 185 supra. An issue may also arise as to the extent to which rele-

vance is a regional or national concept, and the extent to which uniformity of
relevance determinations among the eight Regional Councils is a desirable or necessary factor. The answer may depend largely on whether the factor is ecological,
social, or economic.
199. See note 197 supra.
200.

See notes 178-82 and accompanying text supra.
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portance in the entire procedure-from the decision to file a petition
for review to the ultimate outcome. Particularly in cases where facts
are not definitely ascertainable or not the primary basis of a contested
measure, the placement of the burden can often determine the out20 1
come.
As a general rule, the party challenging a regulation promulgated
through informal rulemaking has the burden of proving that agency
action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful.2 02 Instances may
arise, however, in which a court will find it appropriate to shift the
burden to the agency. For example, when the material necessary to
prove or disprove a fact, or set of facts, "lies particularly within the
knowledge" of a party, the courts generally require that party to bear
the burden of proof.20 3 Shifting the burden in such a situation is

clearly a sound policy choice when the fact in issue is discernible; to
do otherwise would enable the knowledgeable party to gain a tactical
advantage by withholding crucial factual information.
However, where there is no factual uncertainty, and where the
burden has not been statutorily placed,2 0 4 a balancing of all competing policies and interests should precede placement of the burden
of proof.20 5 Applied on a case-by-case basis, this procedure enables a

reviewing court not only to foster the policy values behind the author20 6
izing legislation, but also to control risks of error.
Compare Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
201.
478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) with Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073,
1084 (8th Cir.), application to vacate stay of injunction denied, 418 U.S. 911 (1974),
injunction modified after hearing en banc, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
202. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1083
(8th Cir. 1974); American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d
909, 913-34 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163,
1167 (9th Cir. 1973) ("burden is a heavy one"); Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260, 263
(10th Cir. 1973). This rule seems so well settled that some courts do not even mention that the burden is being placed on the challenger. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
203. See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
204. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
592 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
205. See generally Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking:
A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1760-68 (1975).
206. Leventhal, supra note 121, at 535-36. Judge Leventhal also stated:
It is my feeling that the burden of proof concept will be relied upon increasingly
in review of similar questions by courts which are reluctant, on the one hand,
to interfere with an agency's expert manipulations of test data and, on the other,
to defer blindly to whatever methodology the agency puts forth in support of its
predictions.
Id. at 536. See also Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
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Congress, recognizing that the state of knowledge of marine fisheries was incomplete and sometimes inaccurate, decided in the FCMA
to institute a program of management and conservation of these fisheries through delegation of authority to a unique regulatory structure. 207 This regulatory scheme is protected and fostered if the burden
is placed on the party challenging either policy or factual determina2 08
tions in fishery management schemes.
However, the national standard in the Act requiring that all "conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available"2 09 illustrates that countervailing policies
may make it appropriate to shift the burden. If a challenging party
can make a prima facie showing that a management measure was not
based on the "best scientific information available," the burden should
be shifted to the Secretary.
After weighing the policies and interests at stake and determining
that a shift of the burden is appropriate, the court then must determine what it is that will be shifted. Because factual certainty is not
210
likely to exist in most cases where a shift of burden is appropriate,
"burden of proof' as used in civil trials is not an appropriate standard.
Instead, the courts that have adopted this burden of proof approach
seem to shift more than the burden of going forward but require less
than proof of the correctness of a decision. 2 11 What is required is that
the administrative body adduce a reasoned presentation of evidence
sufficient to persuade the court that the measure is not arbitrary or
capricious.
Thus, the ability of a court to shift the burden of proof offers a
523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975) ("the incidence of the burden of proof is primarily
a matter of policy based on experience").
207. See generally Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 427, 436 (1977) ("The Councils are unique among institutions that manage
natural resources").
208. It is substantially more difficult to prove that a policy-type decision is arbitrary and capricious than to prove that a factual determination is unsupported by
the evidence. See notes 139-45 and accompanying text supra.
209. FCMA § 301(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977). See note 197
supra.
210. An exception to this statement is discussed at note 203 and accompanying
text supra.
211. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("burden
of supporting the agency regulation with evidence . . . rests upon the agency");
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(EPA must "bear a burden of adducing a reasoned presentation supporting the reliability of its methodology").
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flexible mechanism to control administrative error or abuse when: (1)
The administrative action or procedure is contrary to judicial policy
(for example, withholding information that was either relied on in
formulating a management measure or which only the Councils or
Secretary can prove or disprove); (2) the administrative action is contrary to legislative policy (for example, failure to use the "best scientific information available"); or (3) the reviewing court finds the
administrative action to be on the borderline of the legislative man2 12
date.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Senator Warren Magnuson, one of the principal sponsors of the
Act, has stated that "the legislation is new and complex. Any new law
requires a 'shakedown' period, and the FCMA will be no exception." ' 213 An important, if not the most important, participant in this
shakedown will be the courts. They must decide all justiciable conflicts spawned by the Act-ranging from the fundamental structure of
the legislative scheme2 14 to the permissible balancing of interests in
specific management plans. Hence, it will not be until the courts have
developed a body of precedent under the Act that the operation of this
new legislation can effectively be evaluated. Until that time, both the
courts and those affected by the Act will be forced to proceed with
little direct guidance other than the bare outlines of section 305(d).
Christopher L. Koch

212. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
213. See Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV.
427, 427 (1977).
214. See, e.g., Note, Congressional Authorization and Oversight of International
Fishery Agreements Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
52 WASH. L. REV. 495 (1977); Part IV-B-2-a supra.
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